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Abstract 
In December 1990, the 12 regional electricity companies — responsible for the distribution and 
supply of electricity in England and Wales — were privatised. For the first few years following 
privatisation, real prices, profits and costs in the industry rose. Following two Price Control 
Reviews, prices have now fallen sharply and there have been substantial reductions in costs and 
more recently in profits. This paper attempts to conduct a social cost–benefit analysis of the 
privatisation by examining actual and predicted falls in costs over the period to 2005. We conclude 
that the privatisation did yield significant net benefits but that these were unevenly distributed 
across time and groups in society. Relative to our preferred counterfactual, consumers experience 
slightly lower prices and the government gains £5 billion in sale proceeds and net taxes. However, 
consumers begin to gain only from 2000. 
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There have been major changes in the electricity supply industry since it was 
radically restructured in 1990. These changes have included the growth of 
competition in supply and generation, substantial improvements in efficiency 
and reductions in prices, improvements in customer service standards and 
changes in the ownership of many licensed electricity companies. 
The White Paper that announced privatisation (Secretary of State for Energy, 
1988) stated clearly that the main beneficiaries would be the consumers. 
Competition would ‘create downward pressures on costs and prices, and ensure 
that the customer comes first’ (cited in MacKerron and Watson (1996, p. 186)). 
Our main objective is to find out whether consumers benefited from the 
restructuring and privatisation of the regional electricity companies (RECs) in 
England and Wales. 
We use the technique of social cost–benefit analysis (SCBA) as used in 
Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990) to study this question. Our study 
complements previous social cost–benefit analyses of the effect of restructuring 
and privatisation of the Scottish electricity supply industry (Pollitt, 1999), the 
electricity supply industry in England and Wales (Green and McDaniel, 1998), 
Northern Ireland Electricity (Pollitt, 1997b) and the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997). It is also in line with other SCBA 
studies such as Galal et al. (1994). 
This paper seeks to review the performance of the regulated supply and 
distribution businesses of the RECs in the England and Wales electricity supply 
industry since privatisation and evaluates the gains (or losses) from restructuring 
and privatisation. It also assesses the distribution of these gains (or losses) to 
consumers, producers and the government. A SCBA approach is used to achieve 
these objectives. The paper is in six sections. Section II briefly sets out the 
historical background. Section III details the theoretical arguments for 
liberalisation (restructuring and privatisation) and the social cost–benefit 
methodology used. Section IV explains the data, Section V contains the results 
and Section VI concludes. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The electricity supply industry was in public ownership from 1948 to 1990. In 
England and Wales, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was 
responsible for generation and transmission; it sold electricity to 12 area boards 
under the terms of the bulk supply tariff, based upon its marginal costs. The area 
boards were responsible for the distribution and supply to electricity consumers. 
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During the course of 1982, the government’s ultimate intention to introduce 
legislation to allow private companies to set up to provide electricity to 
consumers became clear (Electricity Consumers’ Council, 1982). The White 
Paper Privatising Electricity, in which the government laid out its plans for the 
industry, was published in February 1988 (Secretary of State for Energy, 1988). 
Shortly prior to privatisation in 1990, 12 regional electricity companies 
replaced the 12 area boards. Transmission became the responsibility of the 
National Grid Company (NGC), a company fully owned by the RECs. 
Distribution and supply were uncoupled to some extent, as a REC can supply 
electricity outside its franchise area on the payment of a charge for distribution 
over another REC’s network. 
Each REC owns and operates the electricity distribution network in its 
authorised area. The distribution systems consist of overhead lines, cables, 
switchgear, transformers, control systems and meters to enable the transfer of 
electricity from the transmission system to customers’ premises. Supply 
businesses are engaged in the bulk purchase of electricity and its sale to 
customers. Compared with the supply business of, basically, metering, billing 
and contract management, the distribution business is highly capital-intensive. 
The distribution of electricity is the most important business activity of the 
RECs and typically contributes the majority of their operating cash flow and 
profits. In 1998, distribution and supply charges accounted for approximately 32 
per cent and 13 per cent respectively of a domestic customer’s bill, and 
distribution has a significant influence on the overall quality of supply to 
customers. Analysing the impact of changes in ownership and the regulatory 
framework makes economic sense owing to the potentially large influence that 
electricity distribution may have on final prices, and the distribution of gains or 
losses from these changes. 
Electricity prices are regulated at different levels and stages.
2 The initial 
distribution price controls on the RECs were put in place by the government and 
executed by the Department of Energy at the time of restructuring, and permitted 
price increases ranged up to 2.5 percentage points above the inflation rate 
(OFFER, 1994). Responsibility for future price controls was placed under an 
independent regulatory body, initially called OFFER and latterly known as 
Ofgem.
3 The pattern of price falls in transmission, supply and generation is such 
that the share of distribution costs in final prices has risen since privatisation. In 
the earlier years, there had been public concern about profits and prices; later, 
more concerns were expressed with regard to increased dividends and the ability 
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of distribution companies to finance share buy-backs
4 and about the high prices 
that bidders have been willing to pay to acquire RECs. 
The initial price caps that were set by the Department of Energy were 
considered by many to be somewhat ‘too’ generous to the companies. The most 
important review was in August 1994, when OFFER announced reductions 
averaging 14 per cent in final electricity prices to take effect in April 1995, 
requiring cuts in real terms of 11–17 per cent in distribution charges in 1995–96 
and further reductions in real terms of between 10 and 13 per cent in 1996–97. 
Distribution charges were, thereafter, required to fall by 3 per cent per year in 
real terms for the duration of the price control (until March 2000). These price 
controls were then modified in 1998 to allow RECs to make certain additional 
charges for services to facilitate competition in supply. These distribution price 
controls have been revised from 1 April 2000. Based on Ofgem’s predictions of 
costs and revenues, the RECs will be faced with price controls on distribution 
businesses averaging 3 per cent for the next five years, with an initial cut in 
RECs’ distribution revenue by about 23.4 per cent and an overall revenue cut of 
£503 million at 1995 prices (see Ofgem (1999a)). Controllable costs
5 for the 
RECs are projected to fall by 2.3 per cent per annum over the period 1998 to 
2005. 
Price controls on the RECs’ supply businesses limited average prices to rise 
by no more than inflation during the period 1990–91 to 1994–95, and then 
regulation was tightened to RPI–2 for the supply business of all the RECs until 
March 1998. In April 1998, further revised controls set real reductions in prices 
between 3 and 12 per cent, followed by a real reduction of 3 per cent in 1999. 
Price restraints proposals for 1998 and 1999 were set in 1997, stating an average 
reduction in tariffs in 1998 by 6 per cent and a further average reduction of 3 per 
cent in 1999 (OFFER, 1997). Price controls to apply in 2000–02 have been set 
on standard domestic and Economy-7 customers, with price reductions of 5.7 per 
cent and 2.1 per cent respectively per annum on the final prices. It is expected 
that controls will no longer be necessary after this period, following the expected 
degree of competition in supply (although a review is planned after these two 
years). 
According to Henney (1994), by 1994, the majority of customers had seen no 
price benefit from the privatisation of the electricity supply industry. Small 
domestic and commercial customers effectively financed the privatisation, while 
the largest customers lost the benefit of their special agreements. Only the 
medium-sized (1–5MW) maximum demand customers benefited. This was 
because they were able to purchase cheaper electricity from the generators. 
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Additionally, domestic prices of electricity initially increased, relative to 
industrial prices, by about 5 per cent more than expected, with the increase being 
concentrated in the early years of privatisation and restructuring (Yarrow, 1992). 
Henney (1997) explains the rise in prices and profits after privatisation as a 
regulatory failure, in terms of the lax setting of the initial price control for wires. 
Also, the government could not substantiate the claims for potential productivity 
gains at the time of restructuring, although we calculate a unit labour 
productivity growth of 2 per cent p.a. from 1970 to 1987. We also note that, 
during the period 1981–82 to 1988–89, final electricity prices in England and 
Wales rose at less than the rate of inflation. 
The period 1990 to 1995 saw large increases in the profitability of the RECs, 
leading to large rises in their share prices. Such windfall gains to shareholders of 
privatised utilities attracted the express attention of the UK government, which 
announced the imposition of a tax on utility companies’ profits. The tax on 
RECs amounted to £1.25 billion.
6 The Electricity Association, on behalf of the 
industry, welcomed the Chancellor’s confirmation that the windfall tax ‘will be a 
one-off’ levy and that provision could be made to ‘pay in two instalments’.
7 
Table 7 later summarises the amount of windfall tax paid by the electric utilities. 
After the demerger of the NGC from the RECs in 1995, many changes 
occurred within the electricity supply industry, changing the nature of business 
of the RECs. The lifting of the ‘Golden Share’ meant that mergers and 
acquisitions could take place after 1995. By March 1996, four RECs had been 
taken over and three others were the subject of take-over bids, including bids 
from the leading fossil-fuel generating companies, PowerGen and National 
Power (Green, 1996). A summary of some selected take-over activities that 
involve the RECs is provided in Appendix B. RECs are a more diverse group 
today than was the case five years ago. There have also been significant changes 
in the way that many of the RECs structure their business and the range of 
activities in which they are involved. For example, following successive rounds 
of liberalisation, several RECs have developed very active second-tier supply
8 
businesses. Eastern Electricity now has substantial generation interests; it is, in 
fact, one of the largest generators in England and Wales. Most RECs are now 
active in the supply of gas as well as electricity. This provides opportunities for 
joint marketing of the two fuels.  
The role and scope of regulation for the electricity market have also changed. 
Ofgem is planning to lay tighter restrictions to ensure that each regional 
monopoly electricity distribution business is held in a separate corporate entity, 
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ring-fenced from all other activities carried on within the licensee’s group. It is 
expected that this ring-fencing arrangement will protect capital providers as well 
as consumers. It is also expected that savings from mergers and acquisitions will 
eventually have to pass over to consumers (Ofgem, 1999b). 
III. METHODOLOGY 
1. Theoretical Issues and Empirical Work 
The ideological beliefs underlying restructuring of the electricity supply industry 
in England and Wales were that private ownership and the profit motive gave far 
better incentives than the most benevolent kind of state control (let alone the 
state interference that seemed to be the best that British governments could 
achieve) and that competitive private industries gave better results than 
monopolies (Green, 1998). Efficiency gains following cost reductions, 
depending on the severity of competition and the quality of the regulatory 
framework in place, are assumed to benefit consumers through price reductions 
and improvements in the quality of service. 
The privatisation of utilities is a complex affair, often involving three 
separate and not necessarily connected elements. The first is clearly a shift in 
ownership from the state to private hands. The second is a corporate 
restructuring, leading to the creation of new or radically reshaped companies. 
The third is a change in procedures by which the sector operates, usually 
involving an injection of competitive procedures (Thomas, 1996). New 
regulatory policies, standards and practices often accompany these changes. 
Depending on the combination of these factors, liberalisation will tend to cause 
significant changes in the way businesses are conducted. Pollitt (1997a) 
identifies five theoretical arguments relating to the likely efficiency effects of 
liberalisation. First, liberalisation can improve incentives by reallocating 
property rights from the public to the private sector (Alchian, 1965). Second, 
liberalisation may change the objective functions of managers being faced with 
private sector incentives (following Niskanen (1968)). Third, there may be 
incentives for distortionary resource allocation caused by some types of 
regulation (such as the rate of return regulation) leading to inefficiency 
(following Averch and Johnson (1962)). Fourth, liberalisation may cause 
influence activities within the industry (such as empire building), which may 
cause a divergence from efficiency (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Fifth, theories 
of policy commitment suggest that the government can effectively reduce 
interventions and the costs that accompany these interventions by liberalisation 
(such as in Willig (1994)). 
The UK is a developed market economy, with an electricity sector that has 
developed strong linkages with the rest of the economy. This means that the 
theoretical predictions weakly argue for restructuring and privatisation in the Electricity Distribution and Supply 
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case of property rights, bureaucracy and commitment theories, but are uncertain 
about the sign and magnitude of changes when it comes to incentives under 
regulation and influence activities. Poorly constructed incentive regulation could 
negate all the positive effects from liberalisation. The results of any individual 
restructuring and privatisation process in a given industry and in a given country 
have the potential to be highly variable (Pollitt, 1999). 
There are two broad methods to analyse the impact of liberalisation (Pollitt, 
1997a). One deals with assessing the impact from actual occurrences. The other 
tries to predict or simulate the potential impact based on some historic trends. 
Any overall evaluation of the efficiency effects of privatisation and restructuring 
will need to take into account a wide range of impacts. The methodologies used 
to assess the impact of liberalisation based on price or cost comparisons, such as 
Yarrow (1992) and Bishop and Thompson (1992), or using simulation or frontier 
methodologies, such as Burns and Weyman-Jones (1994), have been subjected to 
a uniform and strong criticism: they do not attempt to address directly the issue 
of whether liberalisation is likely to be socially beneficial. None considers the 
distributional consequences of liberalisation and most neglect the environmental 
costs of liberalisation. A more comprehensive approach would be a 
computational general equilibrium approach (CGE) such as the one used by 
Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999), where the macroeconomic and 
distributional impacts of privatisation and regulation are assessed. Nevertheless, 
the above studies do not possess the power of an overall social cost–benefit 
analysis that we discuss below, and are themselves based on numerous 
assumptions as to specification of objectives and constraints. 
SCBA studies, such as Galal et al. (1994) and others (Pollitt, 1999; Green and 
McDaniel, 1998; Newbery and Pollitt, 1997; Pollitt, 1997b), have addressed the 
failures of the other methodologies. In this study, we use a SCBA framework to 
analyse the effect of liberalising the RECs’ regulated supply
9 and distribution 
businesses in England and Wales. 
2. The Social Cost–Benefit Methodology 
Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990) identify three main groups in society — 
namely, consumers, private producers and government. A full SCBA should, in 
theory, be able to address the impact on economic efficiency and equity. Our 
first objective is to answer the question, ‘Does the (expected) fall in costs 
resulting from restructuring and privatisation warrant the cost of restructuring 
and privatisation?’. Then we shall address the distributional aspect of the 
problem: ‘Who gained and who lost (if anyone) in the process of restructuring 
and privatisation?’. The first question considers the productive efficiency impact 
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of restructuring and privatisation, while the latter issue relates to equity. We are 
ignoring the allocative efficiency aspect, for simplicity.
10 
Jones et al.’s method looks at costs, prices, profits, taxes and consumer 
surplus. For simplicity, we shall follow Newbery and Pollitt (1997), such that 
() sp sg g p WV V Z λλ ∆= − + − , 
where W is social welfare,  sp V  is the social value under private operation,  sg V  the 
social value under continued government operation,  g λ  the shadow multiplier on 
government revenue,  p λ  the shadow multiplier on private funds and Z the actual 
price at which the sale is executed. 
Privatisation will be socially worth while if  0 W ∆>  (a value less than zero 
would imply a net loss to society). Assuming that, in a developed market 
economy, we would expect no big difference in shadow multipliers such that the 
shadow value of public funds is equivalent to the shadow value of private funds, 
we set  1 gp λλ == . Therefore all we are left with is the change in social value of 
the enterprise following the ownership change.  
The calculation of  W ∆  involves the calculation of the difference in (actual 
and predicted) costs under private and public ownership plus an estimate of 
investment cost savings. The only problem is to ascertain what would have 
happened had the enterprise been left under public ownership. In order to 
address this issue, we need to build a set of counterfactuals based on historic cost 
figures and other economic data. Although we can never know what would have 
really happened to the industry or sector under public ownership, this is a 
necessary condition for the SCBA.  
We evaluate efficiency gains due to cost reductions and investment savings 
by deducting the costs under private ownership from the counterfactual costs 
calculated for the public sector. The restructuring and privatisation costs are then 
deducted from the efficiency gains to arrive at the value of  W ∆ . The final 
exercise will be to analyse the distributional efficiency.  W ∆  will be allocated to 
our three groups — consumers, producers and the government — in order to find 
out who gained, who lost and by how much. 
                                                                                                                                    
10The rationale for doing this follows Newbery and Pollitt (1997, p. 280). Dead-weight losses are calculated 
according to the following formula: Dead-weight loss = 0.5×ε ×τ
2 as a proportion of total revenue (where ε  is 
the electricity demand elasticity and τ  is the proportional difference between actual and counterfactual per-unit 
revenue of dead-weight losses). In the year during which we calculate that prices diverged most from the 
counterfactual value, the retail price of electricity would be increased by around 7.5 per cent. Given a total 
retail sales revenue of around £16 billion and an electricity demand elasticity of 0.3, the maximum dead-weight 
loss is £13 million p.a. In the context of what follows, these values can be ignored.  
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Turnover  2,004 2,142 2,152 2,463 2,754 3,752 4,230 4,436 4,666 4,882 4,531 4,400 4,419 
Less NGC exit charges            205  228  252  270  288  278  271  221 
Turnover net  of  NGC  charges  2,004 2,142 2,152 2,463 2,754 3,547 4,001 4,184 4,396 4,594 4,253 4,129 4,198 
Total costs  1,699 1,794 1,903 2,071 2,326 2,960 3,135 3,167 3,229 3,265 3,049 2,945 2,947 
of which:               
  Distribution  costs           1,865 1,910 1,900 1,956 1,962 1,768 1,609 1,555 
 Less NGC exit charges            205  228  252  270  288  278  271  221 
Equals Distribution 
controllable costs 
         1,660 1,682 1,649 1,686 1,674 1,490 1,338 1,334 
  Supply  controllable  costs           419 449 477 467 485 439 442 486 
  Total controllable costs  1,207 1,287 1,375 1,499 1,721 2,079 2,131 2,125 2,153 2,159 1,929 1,780 1,820 
 Depreciation  (CCA)  492 507 528 572 605 676 776 791 806 818 842 894 906 
Operating profit (CCA)  305 349 249 392 427 792  1,094  1,268  1,437  1,617  1,482  1,456  1,471 
Gross  value  of  assets  24,041 24,578 25,696 27,284 28,452 30,383 37,336 38,207 39,108 41,421 42,483 43,960 45,585 
Tax  194 194 170 216 265 217 299 347 393 442 405 398 403 
Units  distributed  (TWh)  209 215 221 226 230 236 239 238 242 245 253 257 259 
Labour,  RECs  83,469 82,512 82,165 83,196 82,500 82,288 81,135 77,329 71,149 65,062 57,317 50,364 47,473 
Labour productivity index               
  RECs  90  94  97  98 100 103 106 110 122 135 159 183 196 
  UK  production  industries  84  91  95  98 100 102 109 118 124 130 128 129 129 
RPI,  September  95  98 102 108 117 129 135 139 142 145 151 154 159 
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In order to achieve the above objectives, we construct consolidated accounts 
of the 12 RECs for the period 1986–87 to 1997–98 (Table 1). For a detailed 
account of the numbers used and adjustments made for the pre- and post-
privatisation periods, refer to Appendix C. Appendix D sets out the privatisation 
scenario (panel 1) and the preferred public ownership counterfactual (panel 2) 
costs, revenues and taxes that we use to calculate efficiency gains and their 
distribution. The differences between the figures for controllable costs in panels 
1 and 2 measure the operating efficiency gains. The differences in revenue give 
the value of the change in customer benefits. The differences in tax measure the 
effect on government flow revenues, while the differences in profit (less 
differences in tax) give a measure of the gains to the producer. 
(a) Comparing Costs with and without Privatisation 
We use four possible scenarios
11 — 0, 1, 2 and 3 per cent counterfactual 
controllable cost decline. We could have used other counterfactuals, such as a 
counterfactual cost increase, or privatisation accompanied by a different 
regulatory framework (a stricter regime versus a more lax regime, etc.). For 
simplicity, and comparability with previous studies (such as Newbery and Pollitt 
(1997)), the latter is not performed in the present paper. 
To arrive at the counterfactual controllable costs, we calculate a base pre-
privatisation figure using three-year averages of the unit controllable costs (equal 
to total controllable costs divided by total units distributed) centring on 1987–88. 
We do not just use the immediate pre-privatisation year, given that it may not be 
representative of the business-as-usual operation of the industry under public 
ownership. We project costs from the base year assuming various counterfactual 
cost declines. For example, the 1 per cent counterfactual cost decline per annum 
will yield a series that takes the three-year average centring on 1987–88 as the 
first value and then generates a series at the common multiplying factor of 0.99 
on a successive yearly basis. 
Once the counterfactual cost declines are calculated, it is easy to find the 
difference between  p C  and  g C  (costs under private and public sectors
12 
respectively). These differences define controllable cost savings potential 
following privatisation. The differences are taken from Appendix D. Beyond 
2005, we lock the per-unit efficiency gains at the 2004–05 level and assume 
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counterfactual, given productivity growth from 1970 to 1987 averaging 2 per cent p.a. We provide more 
support for a 2 per cent counterfactual cost fall p.a. in Section V(3a). We also perform the SCBA using a 4 per 
cent and a 5 per cent counterfactual cost fall and the results are only presented in Table 2. A 0 per cent 
counterfactual implies status quo within the public sector. 
12Note that the costs under the private sector (RECs) have incorporated Ofgem’s projections of future cost 
declines from 1998–99 to 2004–05 (see Appendix D for details). Electricity Distribution and Supply 
117 
continuing demand growth of 1.3 per cent.
13 These values are aggregated on a 
present-value basis using some discount rates. It is useful to experiment with 
different discount rates, both to account for the sensitivity of the results and to 
judge the robustness of the net welfare effects. We used discount rates varying 
from as low as 5 per cent to as high as 12 per cent. We note that a discount rate 
of 6 per cent was the Treasury’s preferred discount rate in the 1980s, 8 per cent 
is the current rate and 10 per cent is a typical private sector discount rate 
(Newbery and Pollitt, 1997). Panel 2 in Appendix D gives the counterfactual 
costs for a 2 per cent p.a. counterfactual cost decline. 
(b) The Investment Savings 
Investment savings originate from the difference between companies’ forecasts 
of capital expenditure and their actual expenditure (and if the latter is regulated, 
as it is for the RECs, then it represents the ‘allowed’ capital expenditure. 
Although capital expenditure needs are a function of the load factor and can be 
sensitive to changes in the load, we calculate investment savings for the RECs as 
the difference between updated forecasts by the RECs and the allowed 
expenditure by OFFER. In 1993, RECs’ forecasts of total capital expenditure for 
the period 1995–96 to 1999–2000 totalled £1.29 billion p.a. (OFFER, 1998c). 
However, following significant efficiency improvements, OFFER’s (1999a)
14 
updated forecast for 1999 and 2000 is £1.10 billion p.a.  
We incorporate these estimates of the investment savings (the difference 
between the expected £1.29 billion and actual £1.10 billion) into our SCBA. 
This is achieved by considering that these additional investments of £190 million 
p.a. would have been undertaken under the public sector, and hence inflating the 
capital expenditure needs of the sector for 1995–96 to 2004–05. We project 
changes in assets, operating profit and depreciation, and build the counterfactual 
per-unit cost and revenue to incorporate these changes. This is done by inflating 
the assets under public ownership by £190 million per year from 1995–96, 
depreciating these assets by 2.5 per cent p.a. and assuming a required 4.75 per 
cent rate of return on these assets. The average revenue figures presented in 
panel 2 in Appendix D, and efficiency savings referred to in Tables 2 and 4–6, 
are inclusive of the investment savings. 
(c) The Efficiency Gains from Restructuring and Privatisation 
The most expected result from restructuring and privatisation is the potential 
competitive pressure from the product and capital markets and the greater 
incentives to cut costs. Unfortunately, for the distribution businesses in England 
and Wales, product competition is not much of an issue. Benefits from 
                                                                                                                                    
13Taken from NGC (1999). 
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restructuring and privatisation should accrue mostly from productive efficiency 
gains. 
The value of efficiency gains from restructuring and privatisation is the 
present value of  gp CC −  plus the present value of investment savings realised 
over the relevant time period. In other words, 
WCI R & P ∆= ∆ + ∆ − , 
where  C ∆  represents savings in controllable costs,  I ∆  is the investment savings 
and  R&P represents the restructuring and privatisation costs aggregated on a 
present-value basis. All restructuring and privatisation costs are assumed to be 
zero under the public sector counterfactual (and after 1998 for the RECs). Table 
3 later illustrates the magnitude of these costs. 
(d) Distribution of the Net Efficiency Gains 
Once the present value of the net efficiency gains is obtained, the next aim is to 
analyse its distribution among the relevant groups (namely, consumers, 
producers and the government). Let us define the benefits to consumers, 
producers and the government as  Cust ∆ ,  Prod ∆  and  Gov ∆  respectively. The 
distribution of welfare gains,  W ∆ , follows the identity 
WC u s tP r o dG o v ∆≡ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ . 
Cust ∆   is calculated as the difference between actual and projected 
counterfactual average revenue of the RECs. Since revenue is made up of (or 
equivalent to) profit plus costs, projecting the counterfactual per-unit revenue 
involves computing the sum of counterfactual profit, counterfactual controllable 
cost and counterfactual ‘other costs’. These ‘other costs’ are the depreciation 
charges. We therefore derive counterfactual per-unit revenues for all 
counterfactual cost declines (see panel 2 in Appendix D).  
Counterfactual operating profit (pre-tax) is calculated using a rate of return 
on the gross value of tangible fixed assets
15 and projected at the rate of return in 
1989–90 (see Appendix D). Although the rate of return was politically fixed 
during the period before privatisation, it was stable until 1988–89. There is 
reason to believe that the net rate of return on net assets in 1989–90 (equal to 
4.75 per cent) was far above what would have occurred under normal conditions 
and ‘had the design to make the sector more attractive to investors’ (Electricity 
Consumers’ Council, 1988). 
Taxes and counterfactual taxes are calculated by projecting a tax rate. The tax 
rate is estimated using information on actual taxes paid. Projecting the tax for the 
                                                                                                                                    
15Gross value of tangible fixed assets is used rather than net assets, given its relative stability compared with 
the latter. Electricity Distribution and Supply 
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public sector would involve using the tax rates and applying them to our 
calculated counterfactual operating profit (see Appendix D). The change in tax 
(actual less counterfactual) is summed on a present-value basis to arrive at 
Gov ∆ . 
Following Newbery and Pollitt (1997), we calculate gains to the producers,
16 
Prod ∆ , as a residual, such that  Prod W Cust Gov ∆= ∆ − ∆ − ∆ . 
3. Assumptions 
We make five important assumptions to generate the data on costs, average 
revenue, profit and tax presented in Appendix D: 
1.  The demand growth rate is 1.3 per cent from 1997–98. 
2. Projected revenue per kWh under private ownership falls as per regulatory 
changes from 1997–98, which we take to be 3 per cent in distribution revenue 
and 6 per cent in supply revenue for 1998–99, and 3 per cent p.a. thereafter 
until 2005. Projected controllable costs change according to distribution and 
supply price controls; from 1997–98 to 2004–05, we assume a 2.3 per cent 
p.a. decline in total controllable costs. 
3.  The rate of fall in controllable costs is constant under each possible scenario, 
such that a 1 per cent p.a. counterfactual fall in controllable costs implies that 
controllable costs will fall at 1 per cent p.a. until the end period (2005). 
Thereafter, any divergences between actual and counterfactual costs are 
locked. 
4. Private sector assets grow at 1.3 per cent, equivalent to the demand growth 
rate, from 1997–98, and depreciation grows at the same rate from 1997–98. 
5.  Counterfactual operating profit is calculated using the 1989–90 rate of return 
under public ownership. 
We make some further assumptions for the RECs with respect to the 
distributional consequences of the restructuring and privatisation. While there 
are many similarities between the distribution systems that RECs operate, there 
are also some differences. For example, companies vary in size (in terms of area 
or the number of customers or the quantity of electricity distributed), in the 
degree to which their customers are scattered in rural areas or concentrated in 
urban areas and in the extent to which they have larger customers who may take 
supply at higher voltages rather than requiring to be transformed to a lower 
voltage, as well as in other ways (OFFER, 1998a). We shall assume that these 
differences between RECs are not of major significance. These are simplifying 
assumptions that we need to make for the SCBA, otherwise weights on physical 
                                                                                                                                    
16Green and McDaniel (1998) use a top-down approach. They calculate electricity price changes and then 
calculate the benefits (or losses) to consumers. We use a bottom-up approach, identifying the cost-driver to the 
price change and then explaining why prices have not fallen as much as costs. Fiscal Studies 
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characteristics expressing these differences would have been required to assess 
the final distribution of gains in efficiency from restructuring and privatisation. 
A detailed REC-by-REC study would be needed to assess the locational 
implications of divergences in physical and other characteristics between RECs. 
Equal social weights are also assumed. That is, the value of one unit of 
currency to consumers is equal to the value placed on it by either the government 
or the producer. 
IV. DATA 
To undertake the SCBA, data on turnover, operating costs, controllable operating 
costs, taxation, operating profit, dividends, costs of restructuring and 
privatisation, employment, output and retail price indices (among others) are 
required for the whole period 1985–86 to 1997–98. A list of the items used is 
given in Appendix C. Table 1 earlier shows the data used. The composition of 
turnover is depicted in Figure 1. Using the actual data on controllable costs, 
‘other’ costs, tax and operating profit, we are able to compute counterfactual 
values for the public sector. Appendix D gives a summary of the data on 
controllable costs, average revenue, depreciation, profit and taxes, under both 
private and public sectors. 
Operating costs cover the day-to-day costs of running the network, such as 
repairs and maintenance, planning and control, overhead costs, NGC exit   
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charges and distribution system business rents and rates. Around one-third of 
operating costs can be considered to be largely outside the control of the 
companies (including the NGC exit charges and depreciation). Price controls 
will have a tendency to reduce the proportion of controllable to total costs. Our 
objective is to evaluate, for the area boards and RECs, the present value 
associated with the change in controllable costs. 
V. THE RESULTS 
1. Cost Changes 
We note that there was a rise in real unit distribution and supply controllable 
costs by about 15 per cent immediately after privatisation in 1990. The cost 
remained at a high level until 1994–95, after which there was a dramatic fall. 
The rise in controllable cost of £358 million (in nominal terms) between 1989–
90 and 1990–91 represents a 21 per cent increase in nominal terms or a 7 per 
cent rise in real controllable costs per unit distributed. Between 1994–95 and 
1997–98, the real controllable cost declined by about 23 per cent, which 
represents a 28 per cent fall in controllable costs per unit distributed. Figure 2 
demonstrates the trend in controllable costs over the entire period of study. This 
diagram incorporates the predicted decline in costs after 1998, based on 
OFFER’s and Ofgem’s forecasts. We note that the results of our SCBA are not 
driven by the initial rise in controllable costs, given that the level was maintained  
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until 1994–95. We observe a clear relationship between the cost changes and 
changes in the regulatory ‘environment’. 
2. Efficiency Gains 
Table 2 provides estimates of the discounted efficiency gains of the RECs. We 
use a 1.3 per cent demand growth rate.
17 All other assumptions made in Section 
III(3) are maintained. 
With a discount rate of 6 per cent, efficiency gains through cost reduction 
(£5.8 billion) and investment savings (£1.3 billion) amount to £7.1 billion with a 
counterfactual cost fall of 2 per cent p.a. and a future controllable cost fall of 2.3 
per cent p.a. This efficiency gain is partly offset by restructuring and   
 
TABLE 2 
Operating Cost and Investment Savings 
Counterfactual  Discount rate 
cost  fall  5% 6% 8%  10%  12% 
  £ billion, 1995 prices 
0%  25.0 19.4 13.1  9.7  7.6 
1%  16.4  12.6 8.4 6.1 4.6 
2%  9.4  7.1  4.6  3.2  2.2 
3%  3.3 2.3 1.2 0.5 0.1 
4%  –2.1 –1.9 –1.8 –1.8 –1.9 
5%  –6.9 –5.7 –4.5 –3.9 –3.6 
  Levelised p/kWh starting in 1994–95 
0%  0.36 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.30 
1%  0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.18 
2%  0.14  0.13  0.12  0.10  0.09 
3%  0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 
4%  –0.03 –0.04 –0.05 –0.06 –0.07 
5%  –0.10 –0.10 –0.11 –0.13 –0.14 
  Percentage cost/kWh 
0%  27% 26% 25% 24%  22% 
1%  18% 17% 16% 15%  13% 
2%  10%  10%  9%  8%  6% 
3%  4% 3% 2% 1%  0% 
4%  –2% –3% –3% –4%  –5% 
5%  –7% –8% –9% –9%  –11% 
 
                                                                                                                                    
17Note that cost savings are sensitive to changes in the demand growth rate. For instance, at a 2 per cent 
counterfactual cost fall and using a 6 per cent discount rate, cost and investment savings amount to £6.3 billion 
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FIGURE 3 
Labour Productivity in the England and Wales Electricity Supply Industry and in 
UK Industries 
 
privatisation costs (of £1.1 billion), yielding efficiency gains net of restructuring 
and privatisation costs of £6.1 billion. Table 3 describes the restructuring and 
privatisation costs discounted at the different rates. The totals in Tables 4a–4d 
are the efficiency gains net of restructuring and privatisation costs at the 
different discount rates. These efficiency gains are driven by increasing labour 
productivity (see Figure 3). 
3. Efficiency Gains for Each Scenario 
(a) Background to the Choice of the Central-Case Scenario 
We select a central-case counterfactual cost fall of 2 per cent as what might have 
happened in the public sector, on the grounds of previous experience of RECs 
and experiences of other publicly owned electricity companies around the time 
the RECs were privatised. At 1985–86 prices, total costs per unit sold for the 
RECs rose by only 2.3 per cent over the whole period 1980 to 1986. Added costs 
(p/kWh) over the same period declined by 3.4 per cent p.a. and distribution costs 
(p/kWh) declined by 1.5 per cent p.a.
18 The number of staff employed per GWh 
was on a continuous decline from 0.39 in 1979–80 to 0.33 in 1985–86, and 
labour productivity growth has been about 2 per cent p.a. between 1970 and 
1987. RECs’ costs declined over the period 1985–86 to 1988–89 by an average 
                                                                                                                                    
18Added cost equals total electricity supply costs less electricity purchase costs less non-CEGB fuel costs less 
profit from non-electric business. Distribution cost is net of income arising from statutory and other non-profit-
earning rechargeable work (refer to Electricity Council’s Annual Reports and ‘Indicators of Performance’ for 
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of 0.8 per cent p.a., and net controllable costs declined at a rate of 0.3 per cent 
p.a. 
On the electricity prices front, by April 1987, prices had fallen by 15 per cent 
in real terms over the previous five years as a result of increased electricity sales, 
improved efficiency and, most importantly, significant falls in world fuel prices 
culminating in a £300 million cut in the CEGB’s coal bill in 1986–87 (Electricity 
Council, 1988). 
If the RECs had continued in public ownership, it is very likely that they 
would have been subjected to unit cost reduction targets of around 2 per cent p.a. 
This was the experience of the Scottish (Pollitt, 1999) and Northern Ireland 
(Pollitt, 1997b) electricity supply industries during the years preceding their 
privatisation. The public sector Nuclear Electric experienced a reduction in   
 
TABLE 4 
Net Efficiency Gains from Restructuring and Privatisation and their Distribution at 
Various Discount Rates 
£ billion, 1995 prices 
 Discount  rate 
  5% 6% 8%  10%  12% 
  (a) Strong pro-privatisation scenario (counterfactual cost fall 0% p.a.) 
∆Prod  10.3 9.5 8.6 8.1 7.7 
∆Gov  –6.0 –4.5 –3.0 –2.1 –1.6 
∆Cust 19.6  13.3 6.4 2.7 0.4 
∆W 23.9  18.3  12.0  8.6  6.4 
  (b) Pro-privatisation scenario (counterfactual cost fall 1% p.a.) 
∆Prod  10.3 9.5 8.6 8.1 7.7 
∆Gov  –6.0 –4.5 –3.0 –2.1 –1.6 
∆Cust 11.0 6.5 1.7  –1.0  –2.6 
∆W  15.3  11.5 7.3 5.0 3.4 
  (c) Central-case scenario (counterfactual cost fall 2% p.a.) 
∆Prod  10.3  9.5  8.6  8.1  7.7 
∆Gov  –6.0  –4.5  –3.0  –2.1  –1.6 
∆Cust  4.0  1.1  –2.1  –3.9  –5.0 
∆W  8.3  6.1  3.5  2.0  1.1 
  (d) Pro-public scenario (counterfactual cost fall 3% p.a.) 
∆Prod  10.3 9.5 8.6 8.1 7.7 
∆Gov  –6.0 –4.5 –3.0 –2.1 –1.6 
∆Cust  –2.1 –3.7 –5.5 –6.5 –7.1 
∆W 2.2  1.2  0.1  –0.6  –1.1 
 Fiscal Studies 
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operating costs (net of fuel costs and provisions) of 3.2 per cent p.a. over the 
period 1989–90 to 1994–95. 
(b) Central-Case Efficiency Gains 
We present our central case in Table 4c. Using a counterfactual cost fall of 2 per 
cent p.a. in the public sector, as discussed in Section V(3a) above, and 
discounting at a rate of 6 per cent (and incorporating the forecast 2.3 per cent 
p.a. reduction in controllable costs), efficiency gains net of restructuring and 
privatisation amount to £6.1 billion at 1995 prices. These gains are sensitive to 
the discount rate used. At a discount rate of 10 per cent, the efficiency gains 
amount to £2.0 billion at 1995 prices. The sensitivity in the present values at 
different discount rates is explained by the skewness of the distribution of costs 
and benefits. Given that most benefits from restructuring and privatisation start 
accruing after 1994–95, using high discount rates to calculate the present value 
at 1995 prices will reduce the significance of these benefits. 
(c) Pro-Privatisation Scenario 
A pro-privatisation scenario may become more likely if there is any reason to 
believe that the performance in the public sector would have worsened after 
1989–90. There are some debates as to whether the labour productivity 
improvement that we noted earlier under state ownership would have been 
sustainable at all.  
Using a counterfactual cost decline in the public sector of 0 per cent (i.e. 
assuming that there would have been no cost change under public ownership) 
yields a net benefit of restructuring and privatisation of £18.3 billion using a 
discount rate of 6 per cent. Table 4b shows that, at a 1 per cent p.a. 
counterfactual cost fall and a discount rate of 6 per cent, the net gain is   
£11.5 billion at 1995 prices. 
Tables 4a and 4b also show that consumers benefit by £13.3 billion at a 6 per 
cent discount rate and a counterfactual cost fall of 0 per cent p.a. and by   
£6.5 billion at a counterfactual cost decline of 1 per cent p.a. This positive 
benefit owes itself partly to the drastic cost and price falls with price controls 
after 1995 and the most recently announced set of price controls. Producers gain 
£9.5 billion (relative to the counterfactual) at 0 per cent counterfactual cost fall 
(unadjusted for windfall tax). 
(d) Pro-Public Scenario 
Table 4d details the pro-public ownership scenario. This scenario is one with a 
high expected rate of cost decline in the public sector that also saves on the costs 
of restructuring and privatisation. With a counterfactual cost decline of 3 per Electricity Distribution and Supply 
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cent p.a., public sector ownership is a more desirable option at a discount rate of 
10 per cent or more. 
4. The Distribution of Benefits Based on the Central-Case Scenario 
We have found that, if  0 W ∆>  and assuming equal social weights, then 
restructuring and privatisation are successful in raising social value. This is the 
case for the privatisation and central-case scenarios described above. An 
investigation into the distribution of the gains will indicate whether that 
allocation achieved ‘fairness’. 
Figure 4 illustrates the trend in distribution and supply prices, actual and 
counterfactual. We can observe that there was a significant hike in prices in the 
initial five years after privatisation. It was only with the Price Control Reviews 
that prices fell drastically. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of gains from 
restructuring and privatisation on an annual basis. It is only after 1999–2000 that 
benefits started accruing to customers (relative to the central-case 
counterfactual). The jumps in the distribution of benefits to consumers 
correspond to the Price Control Reviews after 1995. 
Table 4c gives the distribution of the gains (or losses) from restructuring and 
privatisation under the central case (a 2 per cent counterfactual cost fall, a 2.3 
per cent p.a. future controllable cost reduction). We note that consumers gained 
a modest £1.1 billion (at a 6 per cent discount rate) under private ownership. The 
producers gained about £9.5 billion and the government received £4.5 billion 
less in taxes (or gained £5.0 billion after accounting for windfall tax revenues 
and sale proceeds from privatisation). Higher counterfactual cost falls or higher 
discount rates would mean that consumers suffer from the restructuring and   
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FIGURE 5 
(Annual) Distribution of Efficiency Gains from Restructuring and Privatising the 
RECs in England and Wales 
 
privatisation. Consumers only benefit in the privatisation and central-case 
scenarios, and only at discount rates not exceeding 6 per cent under the central-
case scenario. 
We note an additional benefit to consumers not yet accounted for in the 
above results. The flotation of the NGC allowed the RECs to offer exceptional 
rebates of about £50 per customer, for the period 1996–97. This one-off rebate 
on consumers’ bills also led companies to benefit from rebates on their fossil-
fuel levies. The net benefit that was finally transferred to consumers amounts to 
£890 million (at 1995 prices and discounted at 6 per cent). At a 10 per cent 
discount rate, it amounts to £857 million. 
There may be a potential danger to producers’ profits, which may have an 
adverse impact on future levels of investment and quality of supply. The tough 
regulation, which brought about significant reductions in prices, leads to sharp 
falls in profits by 2005 (to pre-tax profit rates below those in 1989–90). 
Nevertheless, these may have the effect of inducing further efficiency gains. 
We analyse the sensitivity of our results further, by varying the rate of the 
(projected) future fall in controllable costs to 2005, for the central-case scenario 
in Table 5. This shows that faster falls in controllable costs than the rate that 
Ofgem predicts (if ever achievable), and assuming that prices fall at 3 per cent 
p.a. in line with Ofgem predictions, leave the basic patterns of the results 
unchanged. However, competition in supply from 1998, by allowing customers 
to switch suppliers and by encouraging competitive price reductions, may mean 
that the supply component of REC revenue will fall faster than 3 per cent p.a. 
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TABLE 5 
The Central-Case Scenario under Different Levels of Future Cost Reductions 
£ billion, 1995 prices 
 Discount  rate 
  5% 6% 8%  10%  12% 
  (a) Central case with 2% p.a. future cost fall (counterfactual cost fall 2% p.a.) 
∆Prod  9.9 9.2 8.4 7.9 7.6 
∆Gov  –6.1 –4.7 –3.0 –2.2 –1.7 
∆Cust  4.0  1.1 –2.1 –3.9 –5.0 
∆W  7.7 5.6 3.2 1.8 0.9 
  (b) Central case with 2.3% p.a. future cost fall (counterfactual cost fall 2% p.a.) 
∆Prod  10.3  9.5  8.6  8.1  7.7 
∆Gov  –6.0  –4.5  –3.0  –2.1  –1.6 
∆Cust  4.0  1.1  –2.1  –3.9  –5.0 
∆W  8.3  6.1  3.5  2.0  1.1 
  (c) Central case with 3% p.a. future cost fall (counterfactual cost fall 2% p.a.) 
∆Prod  11.3  10.3 9.1 8.4 7.9 
∆Gov  –5.6 –4.3 –2.8 –2.0 –1.6 
∆Cust  4.0  1.1 –2.1 –3.9 –5.0 
∆W  9.7 7.1 4.1 2.5 1.4 
  (d) Central case with 3.3% p.a. future cost fall (counterfactual cost fall 2% p.a.) 
∆Prod  11.7  10.6 9.3 8.5 8.0 
∆Gov  –5.5 –4.1 –2.7 –2.0 –1.5 
∆Cust  4.0  1.1 –2.1 –3.9 –5.0 
∆W  10.3 7.5 4.4 2.7 1.5 
  (e) Central case with 4% p.a. future cost fall (counterfactual cost fall 2% p.a.) 
∆Prod  12.6  11.3 9.7 8.8 8.3 
∆Gov  –5.1 –3.9 –2.5 –1.8 –1.4 
∆Cust  4.0  1.1 –2.1 –3.9 –5.0 
∆W  11.5 8.5 5.0 3.1 1.9 
 
5. Results of SCBA of Other Parts of the Industry 
Our results are in line with previous studies, such as Newbery and Pollitt (1997), 
who performed a SCBA on the restructuring and privatisation of the CEGB. 
Rising profitability and government revenues have meant that consumers did not 
benefit during the first five years after privatisation. 
Table 6 summarises the results of the preferred counterfactual from SCBA 
studies on the electricity supply industry in the UK. The results cannot be strictly Fiscal Studies 
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compared as the analyses use different time periods of real data and anticipated 
regulatory action. However, the available results show significant overall gains 
in three out of four privatisations. 
Consumers lose in the CEGB and Scottish (SESI) cases (and in the RECs 
case at higher discount rates) but gain in the case of Northern Ireland Electricity 
(NIE). It should be noted that this result follows from tough regulation, which is 
included in the analyses of the RECs and NIE but not in the analyses of the 
CEGB and SESI. However, the pattern of initial losses is similar in all cases. The  
 
TABLE 6 
A Comparative Analysis of the Distribution of Net Benefits
a from Restructuring and 
Privatisation in the UK 
£ billion 
   Discount  rate 
  6% 10% 
CEGB Pro-private  case    
(Newbery and Pollitt, 1997)  ∆ Cust  –1.3 –2.2 
Turnover = £9.2 bn (1995 prices)  ∆ Gov  –8.5 –4.1 
  ∆ Prod  19.4 11.5 
  ∆ W  9.6 5.2 
      
NIE Central  case    
(Pollitt, 1997b and 1999)  ∆ Cust  1.0 0.5 
Turnover = £0.5 bn (1995 prices)  ∆ Gov  –0.1 –0.1 
  ∆ Prod  –0.4 –0.2 
  ∆ W  0.5 0.2 
      
SESI Preferred  case    
(Pollitt, 1999)  ∆ Cust  –1.5 –0.8 
Turnover = £1.9 bn (1995 prices)  ∆ Gov  –5.2 –3.1 
  ∆ Prod  6.7 3.6 
  ∆ W  0.0 –0.3 
      
RECs Central  case    
(This paper)  ∆ Cust  1.1 –3.9 
Turnover = £4.9 bn (1995 prices)  ∆ Gov  –4.5 –2.1 
  ∆ Prod  9.5 8.1 
  ∆ W  6.1 2.0 
aUnadjusted for windfall taxation and sale proceeds. 
Source: Adapted from Pollitt (1999). Electricity Distribution and Supply 
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TABLE 7 
Government Sale Proceeds and Windfall Tax Revenues 
£ billion, 1995 prices 
 Discount  rate 
  6% 10% 
Government sale proceeds    
CEGB 9.7  9.7 
NIE 0.9  1.0 
SESI 3.6  3.9 
RECs 8.2  9.8 
Total UK  22.5  24.5 
    
Windfall taxes    
RECs 1.3  1.2 
SESI 0.2  0.2 
Others
a 0.4  0.4 
Total UK  2.0  1.8 
aMostly successor companies to CEGB, with a negligible contribution from NIE. 
 
government loses flow revenues (taxes and dividends) but this is more than 
offset by the proceeds of £22.5 billion (at 1995 prices and discounted at 6 per 
cent) (Table 7). From the RECs alone, restructuring and privatisation benefits 
the government via sale proceeds and windfall taxes of £9.5 billion (Table 7), 
which more than offsets the loss of flow tax revenue and yields a net benefit of 
£5.0 billion. 
Comparing the different privatisations, CEGB and the RECs were the most 
beneficial to society (as reflected by the proportion of net gains to total 
turnover). Overall, consumers seem to have lost. It may be that reforms in the 
electricity generation market, where market power has been reduced, and supply 
competition will eventually deliver net benefits to consumers. The government 
has gained least from SESI, but it gains most from the RECs after adjusting for 
sale proceeds and windfall taxes. Producers see large increases in after-tax 
profits in all but the NIE case, which includes a sharp reduction in real prices in 
1997. Some of the rise in profits was, nevertheless, offset by the windfall tax. 
6. The Quality of Supply: A Note 
One might ask what the effect of restructuring and privatisation has been on the 
quality of supply. If liberalisation has altered this (relative to the counterfactual), 
then such changes should be included in the analysis, as quality of supply is a 
potentially valuable dimension of the output of the RECs. There are various Fiscal Studies 
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ways to judge what happened to the quality of supply following the liberalisation 
of the RECs. However, this is not a simple issue to handle. Incorporating it in the 
full SCBA would require the measurement
19 and valuation of the quality of 
supply and the identification of a counterfactual of what might have happened in 
the absence of liberalisation of the RECs. 
Two main measures of quality of supply are security and availability. 
Security is defined as the number of interruptions per 100 customers. The 
average of 89 interruptions per 100 customers in 1996–97 improved to 88 in 
1997–98 and was better than the 10-year average of 93 interruptions per 100 
customers. But we observe no definite trend in security over the period 1990 to 
1998. OFFER documents note that there have not been major changes in the 
security of supply for any company since privatisation (for example, OFFER 
(1998b)). Figure 6 depicts what has happened to quality of supply, based on the 
average number of minutes lost per customer, since 1981. We observe that the 
low experienced in the 1980s has not been realised after privatisation, but, on 
average, private ownership has managed to maintain quality of supply. 
Availability is defined as the average number of minutes of off-supply 
experienced by customers. Although most companies record an average better 
performance than their 10-year average in 1997–98, variation between them is 
high. There have also been unplanned power cuts throughout the period 1986 to  
 
FIGURE 6 
Minutes of Supply Lost per Customer 
Notes: Figure for 1987–88 includes the effect of the hurricane in 1987. Data for 1988–89 and 1989–90 are 
missing. 
                                                                                                                                    
19Measurement difficulties centre around valuing the cost of a supply interruption, given that this depends on 
the time of day at which it occurs, whether it is planned or unplanned, its length, the type of customer involved 
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1998. No major change in availability trends is noted by OFFER (1998b) for the 
pre- and post-privatisation periods.  
Based on a MORI poll conducted on behalf of OFFER in 1999, two in five 
domestic customers suffered unplanned power cuts in the previous two years. As 
with the other types of power cut, rural residents are notably more likely to have 
done so (62 per cent compared with 35 per cent living in urban locations). More 
than half of domestic customers in some regions have experienced recent 
unplanned power cuts, compared with figures as low as 12 per cent elsewhere 
(OFFER, 1999b). Thus the quality of supply is still an issue. 
To conclude, over the last 12 years, the picture on quality of supply is mixed. 
We observe a slight overall improvement in quality of supply, but the benefits 
have not accrued to all customers equally. There are reasons to believe that rural 
customers have not done too well relative to urban customers. It is difficult to 
develop a counterfactual for quality of supply. It may be that quality of supply 
would have improved over the period if the RECs had continued in public 
ownership. We therefore assume that quality of supply has been maintained and, 
for the purpose of our analyses, can be ignored. 
7. A Discussion of the Results 
Setting out the factual record of the winners and losers for the first eight years of 
privatisation is fairly straightforward. What is more difficult is to interpret the 
record. There are inevitably problems of assessing the results that have occurred 
against what might have happened if the old public sector regime had continued. 
Another effect of the simultaneous changes in ownership, structure and 
regulation is that, even where it is possible to determine outcomes, it is difficult 
to know how to interpret their causes (MacKerron and Watson, 1996). 
Per-unit net controllable costs rose by about 12 per cent during the two years 
between 1988–89 and 1990–91. It was only after 1994–95 that per-unit net 
controllable costs fell to reach their pre-privatisation low. The reduction was 
more drastic after 1996–97, when actual cost reductions beat counterfactual cost 
reductions of even 3 per cent p.a. It might be difficult, at the outset, to marry the 
results of this paper with those of other studies, such as Green (1998), who found 
that final electricity prices for many customers had fallen by 30 per cent in real 
terms since 1990, or Burns and Weyman-Jones (1994), who found that there 
were improvements in the technical efficiency of the RECs after privatisation. 
However, Yarrow (1992) found rapid price increases following the early years of 
privatisation and is in line with some of our findings in this paper. Green (1998) 
also pointed out that, although there is an observed fall in price, it does not 
necessarily mean that costs and prices have been minimised or that distribution 
and supply prices have also fallen. Indeed, Green (1998) suggested that there 
was a rise in non-fuel costs in the initial period. Similarly, Burns and Weyman-
Jones (1994) investigated technical efficiency changes after privatisation using Fiscal Studies 
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data envelopment analysis (with physical inputs and outputs), and their results 
allow us to think that there is a divergence between technical and economic 
efficiency, providing a further rationale for undertaking this SCBA (as pointed 
out by Pollitt (1997a)). 
Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996) found distribution costs to have fallen in 
the years immediately following privatisation. Surprisingly, they estimated 
distribution costs for the pre-privatisation years by using the ratio of distribution 
costs to total electricity supply activity post-privatisation and applying this ratio 
to the pre-privatisation costs. This assumes that privatisation did not change the 
ratio. There is good reason to believe that this may not be correct. Newbery and 
Pollitt (1997) found that generation and transmission costs fell by around 10 per 
cent per unit over the period 1989 to 1993, meaning that the ratio of distribution 
costs to total revenue would have been lower before privatisation by a significant 
margin and the ratio may have risen if costs went up (which is what we find). 
Thus, applying the same ratio significantly overestimates costs in the old public 
sector. 
It would seem that the large number of structural changes that occurred after 
1995 explain some of the rapid reduction in costs. Regulatory reviews have 
helped greatly after 1994–95. But the natural question that comes to mind is, 
‘How much of the cost decline is explained by the regulatory Price Control 
Reviews and how much is explained by the structural changes that started taking 
place after 1995?’. Answering this question would take us beyond the objective 
of the present work. 
Possible explanations for the initial cost increases include: a rise in materials 
and services costs due to subcontracting to subsidiaries to shift costs out of 
regulated businesses; wage costs inflated by privatisation; discontinuities 
between the area boards and the RECs; lax regulatory controls; a rise in 
institutional costs caused by the creation of new businesses and markets; and/or 
possibly some other restructuring costs not explicitly included in the exceptional 
and extraordinary items. The eventual cost reductions and efficiency 
improvements could be explained by the regulatory success of the Price Control 
Reviews after 1994–95 and by the significant restructuring that took place after 
1995 with the sale of NGC and the lifting of the ‘Golden Share’, leading to 
major acquisitions and merger activities. If price reviews after 1994–95 
contributed to most of the fall in costs, then the initial cost increases were largely 
due to regulatory failure. 
Figure 5 earlier depicts the distribution of net efficiency gains to consumers, 
producers and the government. It was only after 1999–2000 that positive 
material benefits (relative to the central-case counterfactual) started to accrue to 
consumers. This would suggest that our choice of discount rate in computing the Electricity Distribution and Supply 
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net present values of costs and benefits is crucial to yielding the kind of results 
that we expect.
20 
‘The regulator’s proposals [from 2000] for deep cost cutting in electricity 
distribution businesses represent a tough challenge for the industry. In addition, 
businesses are being faced with new and very demanding performance targets’.
21 
The future costs to producers, the gains to consumers and the large gains to the 
government from restructuring and privatisation (at Ofgem’s projected 2.3 per 
cent p.a. fall in costs) imply that the tougher regulation imposed on the RECs 
may possibly constitute another serious regulatory failure, failing to judge the 
incentive effects on the RECs and the long-term viability of the industry as a 
whole. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Our aim has been to assess the costs and benefits of the process of restructuring 
and privatisation of the RECs in the UK electricity supply industry. We do this 
by including the regulator’s price reviews for the years until 2004–05. A social 
cost–benefit analysis is used to achieve our aim. 
1.  We find a rapid increase in revenue of the distribution and supply businesses, 
leaving per-unit revenue at an average of 22 per cent above the pre-
privatisation-period level during the first price control period. 
2. We infer a restructuring and privatisation cost (at 1995 prices) equal to   
£1.1 billion at a 6 per cent discount rate. This cost reduces the benefits of 
restructuring and privatising the distribution and supply businesses of the 
RECs. 
3. From the experience of electricity supply industries in Northern Ireland and 
Scotland and of Nuclear Electric, and from the performance of the area 
boards during the period 1979 to 1989, a 2 per cent p.a. counterfactual cost 
fall is considered reasonable. 
4. Net efficiency gains from restructuring and privatisation (relative to our 
central case), which started accruing to consumers after 1999, amount to 
about £6.1 billion. We note that the net efficiency gains of the RECs are very 
                                                                                                                                    
20An exercise into the analysis of efficiency gains and the net benefits to consumers, by locking the data at 
1997–98 (assuming that there is no further change in regulation and excluding the forecasts of cost and price 
declines of Ofgem), reveals that, at a 2 per cent counterfactual cost decline and using a 6 per cent discount rate, 
the net efficiency gains (net of restructuring and privatisation costs) amount to £3.3 billion, and the net effect 
on consumers is a loss of £14.3 billion. These results suggest that all the benefits that are expected to accrue to 
consumers are entirely based on the expected future cost and price decline and the redistribution of revenue that 
has been proposed by Ofgem. This sort of analysis raises the serious issue of whether restructuring and 
privatisation of the RECs gave rise to the sort of benefits that were initially expected. 
21‘Regulator’s price controls: Electricity Association response’, Press Release PR/55/99, Electricity 
Association, London, 2 December 1999. Fiscal Studies 
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sensitive to the discount rate used, mainly due to the skewness in the 
distribution of these gains. 
5. Labour productivity nearly doubled in 1997–98 over its 1990–91 level. 
Productivity growth during the period 1970 to 1987, of 2 per cent p.a., does 
not match the growth experienced after 1994–95. 
6.  The regulatory structure (set before the creation of OFFER) that defined the 
initial price controls during the early years of privatisation did not contribute 
to cost decline. We find that the benefits of restructuring and privatisation 
came about mostly from institutional changes after 1995 and from 
distribution and supply Price Control Reviews of OFFER and Ofgem. The 
unit costs of the RECs fell an unprecedented 20 per cent between 1994 and 
1998.  
7.  As a base case, we find that consumers are expected to gain £1.1 billion (at 2 
per cent counterfactual cost fall and 6 per cent discount rate) relative to 
continued public ownership of the RECs. With the NGC rebates they were 
offered in 1995–96, total benefits to consumers would be about £2 billion; 
however, consumers lose at a 10 per cent discount rate. It is noted that, by 
1998, consumers have lost considerably from the restructuring and 
privatisation of the RECs, and the net benefits we derive from the SCBA are 
based on discounted (expected) future benefits. 
8. The government would have gained about £5.0 billion (sale proceeds plus 
change in taxes) from the restructuring and privatisation of the RECs. 
9.  We observe that these results have happened at a time when there have been 
no significant changes in the overall quality of supply. 
We find rapid increases in profits during the first few years after 
privatisation. The tough regulatory structures put in place have tried to erode 
these profits, and this intention was confirmed by the imposition of windfall 
taxes in 1997. With the more stringent regulation, we wait to see more benefits 
accruing to consumers to cover the loss in the initial periods after privatisation. 
But tougher regulation designed to achieve greater levels of ‘efficiency’ can also 
significantly alter the distribution of those gains away from producers, inducing 
perverse effects on long-run efficiency, incentives, quality of supply and service 
reliability. Electricity Distribution and Supply 
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY OF DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY PRICE CONTROLS 
FOR RECs IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
Period  Rate of price (cost) decrease 
Distribution businesses   
1990–91 to 1994–95  Variable up to 2.5% above the inflation rate 
1995 to 1995–96  11–17% (average of 14%) 
1996 to 1996–97  10–13% 
1997 to April 2000  Average of 3% p.a. 
2000 to 2004–05  One-off cut in distribution revenue by 23.4% in 2000–01; then a 3% 
p.a. fall in unit revenue until 2005 
Supply businesses   
1990–91 to 1994–95  0% in final prices 
1995 to 1997–98  2% p.a. fall in supply business net revenue 
1998 to 1999  6% reduction in tariffs in 1998–99; further 3% reduction in 1999–2000 
2000 to 2002  Overall price reductions of 5.7% p.a. for standard domestic customers 
and 2.1% for Economy-7 customers. These price controls are 
accompanied by the reallocation of costs from distribution to supply, 
and hence subject to another set regulatory control. 
 
APPENDIX B overleaf 
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APPENDIX B 
TAKE-OVER ACTIVITY IN THE UK ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
INDUSTRY 
 
Target company  Bidder  Date of completion 
SWEB plc  Southern Group (US)  18.09.95 
Eastern Group plc  Hanson plc  18.09.95 
Manweb plc  Scottish Power plc  12.10.95 
NORWEB plc  North West Water plc  08.11.95 
SEEBOARD plc  Central & South West 
Corporation (US) 
11.01.96 
SWALEC  Welsh Water plc  29.01.96 
Midlands Electricity  Avon Energy  07.06.96 
Northern Electric plc  CE Electric UK plc  24.12.96 
East Midlands Electricity plc  DR Investments (UK) plc  10.01.97 
London Electricity plc  Entergy Power (UK) plc  07.02.97 
Yorkshire Electricity plc  Yorkshire Holdings  01.04.97 
The Energy Group plc (Eastern)  Texas Utilities Company  19.05.98 
East Midlands Electricity plc  PowerGen  27.07.98 
Southern Electric  Scottish Hydro-Electric  14.12.98 
London Electricity plc  Electricité de France  27.01.99 
Midlands Electricity supply business  National Power  19.04.99 
SWEB supply business  London Electricity (EDF)  12.06.99 
SWALEC British  Energy  13.09.99 
Note: This table is adapted from CRI (1998, Table A, p. xviii) and CRI (1999, Table B, p. xxi). We provide 
only those take-overs that have been completed and we have excluded those that were rejected or withdrawn. 
APPENDIX C 
CONSTRUCTING ACCOUNTS FOR RECs IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 
1985–86 TO 1997–98: SOURCES AND METHODS 
The pre-privatisation information for the 12 RECs (i.e. the area boards) is drawn 
from their respective Annual Reports and Accounts and from the Main 
Prospectus (Kleinwort Benson, 1990). For the post-privatisation era, both 
Annual Reports and Accounts of the RECs and their published Regulatory 
Accounts have been used. The physical data of the RECs are also drawn largely 
from their Annual Reports. However, reporting between companies differs and 
some data are not published. We resorted to company reports sent to us direct 
from the companies. In the period 1994 to 1998, a lot of these data have been 
extracted from OFFER’s ‘Reviews of Supply Businesses’, ‘Price Control 
Reviews’ and ‘Draft Papers on Competition’, which are published on Ofgem’s 
website. Every effort has been made to correct for discrepancies. Electricity Distribution and Supply 
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Below is a brief description of the items, the variations between the company 
spreadsheets and the adjustments made. 
 
Item
a  Source and details 
Electricity turnover
b  For the years 1986 to 1990, these items have been taken 
from the Main Prospectus and area boards’ Annual Reports 
and Accounts. For distribution and supply businesses, 
turnover for 1986 to 1990 is net of purchases of electricity. 
For the period 1990–91 to 1997–98, total turnover is 
calculated by adding distribution turnover (net of 
exceptional and extraordinary items) to the value-added in 
the supply business (equals operating profit plus implied 
operating costs). Post-privatisation data have been obtained 
from the RECs’ Annual Reports and Accounts. 
   
Operating costs  For the years 1986 to 1990, the information has been taken 
from Annual Reports and Accounts. For the years after 
1991, the item is a sum of the distribution and supply 
businesses’ operating costs. The item has been adjusted for 
depreciation following current cost accounting and for 
exceptional and extraordinary items. Adjustments for NGC 
exit charges were made once the data for each company 
were aggregated. Totals of NGC exit charges were obtained 
from OFFER documents. Supply operating costs are made 
up of distribution costs and administrative expenses. Costs 
are before monetary working capital adjustment. 
Depreciation has been adjusted to account for common 
costs. 
   
Units distributed (TWh)  Most data have come from Annual Reports. For 1997–98, 
data for some companies are missing and the figures were 
extracted from OFFER’s ‘Supply Price Control Reviews’ 
(several volumes). 
Total gross value of assets 
(excluding consumer contributions) 
For the pre-privatisation period, this is given as the 
difference between the cost of tangible fixed assets at 31 
March and the value of consumer contributions at 31 
March. The full company figure is multiplied by 0.95 to 
account for non-electricity-supply assets. The post-
privatisation equation is the sum of the distribution and 
supply tangible fixed assets. This provided the most stable 
basis for projecting counterfactual profit. 
   
NGC exit charges  Figures are available for 1993–94 to 1997–98 in OFFER’s 
‘Distribution Price Control Proposals’. For other years, 
they are published in OFFER documents. NGC exit charges 
are non-controllable costs to the RECs. 
   
RPI, September  The RPI refers to September of the financial year. It has 
been taken from the Office for National Statistics website. 
   Fiscal Studies 
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Item
a  Source and details 
RECs’ controllable costs  These are the controllable costs of both the supply and 
distribution businesses aggregated (total operating costs 
less NGC exit charges, depreciation and exceptional costs). 
   
Labour employed  This has been extracted from the Annual Reports and 
Accounts and from values sent direct by the companies. For 
1998, it was calculated from CRI (1999).  
   
Productivity index, 
UK production industries 
This has been extracted from Economic Trends Annual 
Supplement and represents the output per employee in UK 
production industries. 
   
Restructuring and privatisation costs  These have been extracted from Annual Reports and 
Accounts (basically, from the restructuring costs of 
privatisation component of exceptional items). 
Restructuring and privatisation costs exclude flotation costs 
and the costs associated with OFFER. Restructuring and 
privatisation costs are assumed to be zero after 1998–99. 
   
Tax  This has been extracted from the Main Prospectus  and CRI 
(various). Tax figures from the Main Prospectus give the 
tax liability based on the assumption that each area board 
was an independent entity for this purpose. For later years, 
for the RECs, tax liability is calculated on the same basis. 
The tax rate is calculated as tax as a proportion of operating 
profit before tax. Prior to privatisation, we assume 92% of 
total tax relates to electricity supply. Afterwards, we 
assume a tax rate of 27% (see panel 1 in Appendix D) 
aElectricity turnover, operating costs, etc. are net of income from or costs incurred in non-electricity businesses 
(such as appliance retailing). These values are also net of extraordinary and exceptional items. Turnover 
includes non-trading rechargeables and other income. 
bThe turnover for supply businesses includes internal turnover. This might slightly inflate the operating costs 
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Company Accounts and Reports
22 
Eastern  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
East Midlands  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
London  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
Manweb  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
Midlands  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
Northern  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
NORWEB  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
SEEBOARD  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
Southern  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
SWALEC  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
SWEB  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
Yorkshire  Annual Reports and Accounts 1985–86 to 1997–98 
Regulatory Accounts from 1990–91 to 1997–98 
Other Accounts and Reports 
Electricity Consumers’ Council (London)  Annual Reports 1980 to 1988 
Electricity Council (London)  Indicators of Electricity Supply Industry Performance 1985 to 1988 
  Annual Report and Accounts 1988–89 
 
                                                                                                                                    
22Other data have been gratefully received direct from the RECs themselves. Fiscal Studies 
146 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Term Definition 
CCA  current cost accounting 
CEGB  Central Electricity Generating Board, formerly incorporating all the 
electricity businesses in the UK 
first-tier supply  the supply of electricity by a regional electricity company to customers 
in its own area 
liberalisation  restructuring and privatisation 
NGC  National Grid Company, the company that owns the transmission 
network 
NIE  Northern Ireland Electricity 
OFFER  Office of Electricity Regulation, the office regulating electricity 
businesses in the UK 
Ofgem  Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, replacing OFFER and 
incorporating the Office for Gas Regulation (Ofgas) 
RECs  regional electricity companies, replacing the area boards after 
restructuring and privatisation 
SCBA  social cost–benefit analysis, the method of analysis used in this study 
second-tier supply  supply of electricity outside a REC’s own area 
SESI  Scottish electricity supply industry 
 